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REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS ON THE
TITANIC: THE INADEQUACY OF
MODEST PROPOSALS TO
REFORM LABOR LAW
Charles B. Craver*
AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATION-

LAW. By William B. Gould N. Cambridge: The
MIT Press. 1993. Pp. x, 313. $37.50.

SHIPS AND THE

It is impossible for any neutral observer to be sanguine regarding the current state of the American labor movement. 1 The union
density rate - the percentage of nonagricultural labor force participants in labor organizations - has declined from a high of 35 %
in 19542 to15.5% today.3 When the increase in public sector unionization over the past several decades is discounted, the dire state of
private sector unions becomes even more apparent. The private
sector density rate is currently an anemic 10.9%4 - the lowest figure since 1936. If the rate of membership decline over the past
twelve years continues, the private sector union density rate may
fall to five percent by the end of this decade.5 Labor organizations
would only be relevant - and, in light of international competition,
would diminish in significance - in such heavy industries as automotive, electronics, and steel.
The decline of labor organizations might be palatable if counterbalanced by increased respect for and protection of individual employee rights. This has not, however, been the case. Even though
Congress has enacted more expansive statutes protecting employees against certain forms of invidious discrimination, and even
though employees enjoy minimal wage, health and safety, and ben* Leroy S. Merrifield Research Professor of Law, George Washington University. B.S.
1967, M. Indus. & Lab. Rel. 1968, Cornell; J.D. 1971, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. See generally CHAru.Es B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF
nm AMERICAN LABOR MoVEMENT (1993); MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF 0ROANIZED LABOR IN nm UNITED STATES (1987); PAUL C. WEILER, GoVERNINO nm WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990).
2. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 1, at 10, tbl. 1.
3. See Data for 1994 Shows Membership Held Steady at 16.7 Million, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 27, at D-1 (Feb. 9, 1995).
4. Id.
5. See Union Coverage of U.S. Private Workforce Predicted to Fall Below 5 Percent by
2000, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 241, at A-1 (Dec. 18, 1989).
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efit protection, most American workers are less confident of their
future employment security today than they have been since the
Great Depression. Under the traditional employment-at-will doctrine that still is accepted in forty-nine states, workers may be terminated at any time for good cause, bad cause, or no cause.
Technological advancements may supplant them, or they may lose
their positions to workers in emerging nations who earn one-tenth
the wages of U.S. personnel. Their employers are under no legal
obligation to discuss these possible developments with the directly
interested employees before implementing final management decisions and laying off the adversely affected individuals. Nor are
firms required to consult their workers regarding other operational
modifications that may profoundly alter employee job functions or
future employment security. Rank-and-file personnel are given no
more respect than the machines they operate.
In his thoughtful book Agenda for Reform, Professor William
Gould6 describes both the demise of the American labor movement
and the continuing erosion of worker dignity and job security. He
explores the absence of wrongful termination protection for most
U.S. employees and the lack of meaningful worker participation
programs. He then evaluates the need for National Labor Relations Act amendments that would streamline the certification process and expand the scope of collective bargaining. He also
proposes measures that would increase the economic weapons
available to representative labor organizations. Gould concludes
by comparing the American and Canadian experiences over the
past several decades in an effort to understand the unique nature of
the American decline in union density.
In Agenda for Reform, Gould recommends many legal changes
that would enhance individual employment rights, encourage the
growth of unions, and contribute to the efficacy of the collective
bargaining process. Even though a number of management representatives consider many of Gould's proposals radical, his suggested modifications are truly modest and, in fact, wholly
inadequate to alleviate the crises facing ·both individual workers
and labor organizations. They are more reflective of the current
conservative political climate than of the true needs of American
workers.
It is time to acknowledge that U.S. workers have minimal employment dignity and almost no job security. Instead of being considered an integral part of the production or service process, they
are treated like fungible machines. They are ignored by most management officials when critical operational decisions are formu6. Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Stanford University. Professor Gould is currently on leave from Stanford University and is Chair of the National Labor Relations Board.
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lated, and they enjoy meager statutory protections. The
circumstances affecting labor organizations are even worse. Unions
have found it extremely difficult to organize new bargaining units,
due to the overt hostility of most business firms. The relatively few
labor organizations that currently represent employees are fearful
of management-encouraged decertification efforts, find it increasingly arduous to negotiate effectively over the most significant issues affecting bargaining unit members, and have few economic
weapons they can use to support their bargaining demands. In the
coming years, the United States must decide whether it will view
free trade unions as an important part of a democratic society or,
instead, provide corporate leaders with unrestrained authority over
lower-level personnel.
J.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO TIIE RISE AND DECLINE
OF UNIONS

In his first substantive chapter, Chapter 1\vo, Gould briefly describes the expansive growth of unions from 1935 until 1955, a
growth fueled by the ability of newly created industrial unions to
organize the automobile, electronics, rubber, steel, textiles, and
transportation industries. Curiously absent from this part of the
book is any significant acknowledgement of the momentous impact
of the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)7 in
1935 and its explicit congressional policy "encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and ... protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association [and] self-organization ...· ."B
Gould next describes the three major developments that have
contributed to the substantial decline of labor organizations over
the past several decades. The first factor cited is the development
of a global economic system that has forced domestic firms to compete with business enterprises in lower-wage countries (pp. 12-13).
The rise of multinational corporations has undermined labor solidarity and forced high-wage American employees to compete
against personnel in countries such as Mexico, where wage rates are
approximately one-tenth of those in the United States (pp. 12-13).
Moreover, the creation of the North American Free Trade Zone
will encourage the migration of traditional unionized manufacturing jobs from the United States to Northern Mexico. American
production workers whose jobs are not transferred will need to
moderate their wage and benefit expectations if they are to avoid
ultimate displacement by foreign laborers (p. 13).
7. Pub. L No. 74-198, 49 Stat 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69
(1988)).
8. 29 u.s.c. § 151 (1988).
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Between 1969 and 1985, 3,500,000 production jobs were transferred from the United States to other countries.9 Over the next
decade, employers will relocate several million additional production jobs to Mexican facilities to take advantage of the lower labor
costs, minimal health and environmental law enforcement, and hostile union climate in that country. Millions of other production jobs
have been supplanted by technologically advanced machines, as the
United States has changed from a production economy to a postindustrial society composed primarily of white-collar and service
personnel.10 These phenomena will threaten the continued viability
of major industrial unions like the United Automobile Workers, the
United Steelworkers, the United Mine Workers, and the International Union of Electrical Workers. Although the global economy
and deindustrialization have also affected nations such as Canada,
Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, their labor
organizations have not suffered the significant membership losses
sustained by U.S. unions (pp. 14-15, tbl. 2.1). This observation
would suggest that factors unique to the United States are primarily
responsible for the decline of American labor organizations.
Even within the United States, the increase in international
competition does not explain the lack of union organizing success in
the expanding service sector among employees whose jobs cannot
be easily exported to foreign nations. Although employees performing routinized jobs for bureaucratic institutions in the banking,
computer, health care, and insurance industries should be ripe for
collectivization, union success in these service areas has been minimal. Gould attributes this situation to his second determinative factor - the antilabor environment generated during the Reagan
administration (pp. 13-14). The Reagan Labor Board enlarged
management prerogatives by refusing to require collective bargaining with respect to corporate decisions that Board members
thought management officials should unilaterally decide (pp. 2125). Support for Gould's view regarding the negative impact of the
anti-union Reagan presidency may be found in the data indicating
that during the 1980s the absolute number of union members declined for the first time since the enactment of the NLRA. 11
Gould fails to ask whether the election of President Reagan actually generated the anti-union climate of the 1980s or merely
served as a reflection of an antilabor environment created by private business firms in the mid to late 1970s that culminated in the
election of President Reagan in 1980. American business leaders
9. See CRA.VER, supra note 1, at 45.
10. See id. at 40·42.
11. See id. at 35.
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have historically opposed worker organizing. 12 During the late
1800s and early 1900s, for example, they used antitrust and criminal
conspiracy doctrines to prevent unionization.13 They required employees to sign "yellow-dog" contracts that precluded union membership and hired private detective agencies to report on the
concerted activities of their workers. Employers summarily terminated union sympathizers and blacklisted them, preventing subsequent employment with other area firms.
Business leaders vigorously opposed enactment of the NLRA,
and they lobbied diligently for the adoption of the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act14 and the 1959 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act15 amendments to the NLRA that were
designed to dilute the rights previously extended to employees and
labor organizations. In some instances, moreover, legislative modifications were not even necessary because conservative Labor
Board and court decisions had already narrowed worker rights. For
example, even though the original NLRA explicitly guaranteed employees the right to withhold their labor during bargaining disputes,16 a pro business-oriented Supreme Court quickly weakened
this fundamental right by holding that employers could hire permanent replacements for striking workers.17
Unionized firms appeared to tolerate their representative labor
organizations during the 1960s and early 1970s, but the hyperinflation of the mid-1970s reminded these employers of the high costs of
unionization. Cost-of-living adjustment provisions in bargaining
agreements caused the union wage premium - the difference between the wages paid to organized workers and their nonunion
counterparts - to increase in many industries to at least :fifteen-totwenty percent. Unionized businesses thus found it more difficult
to compete with unorganized companies, so they began to look for
ways to undermine the labor movement. In 1977, when union officials sought modest changes in the NLRA through the proposed
Labor Law Reform Act, business organizations lobbied diligently
12. See generally id. at 47-51.
13. See, e.g., Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) {holding
union strike activity to be violation of antitrust laws); Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274 {1908)
(same); Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011(Mass.1900) {holding union strike activity unlawful as
criminal conspiracy); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896) (same).
14. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 {1947).
15. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 {1959).
16. See Pub. L No. 74-198, § 13, 49 Stat. 449, 457 {1935) (codified as amended at 29
u.s.c. § 163 {1988)).
17. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938); see also Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fedn. of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 432-43 {1989)
{holding that less senior "cross-over" employees refusing to honor initial strike call or deciding to return to work during the stoppage could, after labor dispute had been resolved, retain
higher positions obtained while more senior colleagues were on strike).
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to prevent these legislative changes. Union leaders felt betrayed by
this behavior, which served as a reminder of the increasingly adversarial labor-management environment they faced.
By the late 1970s, the business community realized that control
of the White House could prevent the enactment of prolabor legislation and allow it to seize control of the Labor Board and the federal judiciary. Business organizations thus expended millions of
dollars in an effort to place Ronald Reagan in the White House.
Having accomplished this goal, they then lobbied effectively for appropriate presidential vetoes and for the appointment of judges
who believed that unionization generated a cartel-based wage premium that undermined free market efficiency. These judges
thought that collective bargaining by representative unions should
not be permitted to interfere with the exercise of managerial discretion. The Supreme Court thus ruled that "in view of an employer's
need for unencumbered decisionmaking," the duty to bargain over
corporate decisions having a substantial impact on the continued
employment of bargaining unit personnel "should be required only
if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collectivebargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of
the business."18 If one acknowledges that a fundamental purpose
of unionization is to allow employees to "interfere with" managerial freedom, it becomes obvious that the First National Maintenance decision qupted above reads more like a legislative
committee ~eport than a judicial decision. The Court's assault on
the organizational rights of workers continued in another case that
held that university professors are "managerial" personnel who are
not subject to NLRA coverage.19 These holdings encouraged the
conservative Reagan Labor Board to erode other doctrines protecting employee rights.20
18. First Nat. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981).
19. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); see also NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp. of America, 114 S. a. 1778, 1782-83 (1994) (holding that professional people who minimally direct the work of nonprofessionals constitute excluded "supervisors").
See generally David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE LJ. 689 (1990) (arguing that traditional collective bargaining subjects are incompatible with professionalism and that modifications to
collective bargaining are needed to make the labor system more conducive to professional
values); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers From Covered Professionals
Under the NLRA, 89 CoLUM. L. R.Ev.1775 (1989) (arguing that the exclusion of professional
employees as managers is contrary to the NLRA's legislative history).
20. See, e.g., Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986) (holding that nonunion employees who individually complain about unsafe conditions are not engaged in a protected
concerted activity), affd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1205 (1988); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985) (holding that nonunion
workers do not have right to have fellow employees accompany them to management investigatory interviews that they think will result in disciplinary action).
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The third critical factor that Gould cites to explain both the decline of unions and the erosion of individual employment rights is
the recent expansion of more tenuous employment relationships
(pp. 25-26). According to Jonathan Hiatt and Lynn Rhinehart,
"The past decade has seen tremendous growth in the contingent
work force. Together, temporary, contract, and part-time workers
make up 25 percent to 30 percent of the work force as a whole."2 1
These attenuated employment relationships have become especially
popular in retail and service establishments, making it more difficult for unions to organize these businesses.
To explain the degree of anti-union sentiment exhibited by most
American firms as opposed to their European counterparts, Gould
emphasizes a crucial difference between collective bargaining in
many Western European countries and collective bargaining in the
United States. Collective negotiations in nations like Germany and
Sweden are conducted on a centralized basis at the regional or national level, with government fiat extending the negotiated wages
and benefits to firms throughout the industry involved (p. 35). In
the United States, in contrast, bargaining takes place in a highly
decentralized manner, with negotiated wages and benefits affecting
only the workers in the pertinent bargaining units. This American
practice greatly increases the cost of unionization to organized companies by permitting unorganized firms to gain a competitive advantage through the adoption of lower wages and less generous
fringe benefits. This factor explains why organized employers have
worked diligently over the past fifteen years to decertify, or at least
to weaken, incumbent bargaining representatives.
Although Gould notes in a subsequent chapter the use of unlawful tactics by many American employers to discourage worker
organizing, he discounts the overall impact of this phenomenon (pp.
151-52). Evaluations of Labor Board data by Professor Paul Weiler22 and by Professors Robert LaLonde and Bernard Meltzer23
have documented an alarming increase in employer unfair labor
practices during organizing campaigns over the past fifteen years.
Employers routinely threaten plant closures or production transfers
and frequently terminate key union supporters in violation of Section 8(a)(3).24 These tactics make it difficult for unions to organize
21. Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lynn Rhinehart, The Growing Contingent Work Force: A Challenge for the Future, 10 LAB. LAW. 143, 144 (1994).
22. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 238-39.
23. See Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another
Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 961-69 (1991); see
also Paul C. Weiler, Hard Tunes for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. Clu. L.
REv. 1015 (1991).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). This provision makes it an unfair labor practice for
employers to discriminate against employees to encourage or discourage membership in labor organizations. Regarding the pervasive use of questionable anti-union tactics by employ-
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new units. Workers who fear employer retaliation are hesitant to
demonstrate their union support openly, and many individuals are
afraid to sign union authorization cards or to vote for union representation. Anemic Labor Board remedies have done little to discourage these unlawful anti-union tactics. Corporations realize that
it is often less costly to defend and even remedy pervasive unfair
labor practices than to be saddled with collective bargaining obligations that will place them at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis their
unorganized competitors. It is this illegal behavior by a number of
American firms that distinguishes the rapidly deteriorating union
situation in the United States from the more stable union environments in Canada and most Western European countries.
In addition to citing illegal employer practices, Gould notes the
relatively unique business union movement in the United States,
drawing a comparison to the social and political labor organizations
indigenous to Western European nations (pp. 45-47). Foreign labor
movements have historically united workers by both socioeconomic
class and political affiliation. This factor has enhanced union solidarity during periods of economic crisis and political hostility. In
the United States, in contrast, employees tend to view labor organi- .
zations solely in terms of the economic benefits they may obtain
through the bargaining process. When workers conclude that bargaining representatives are unlikely to advance their economic interests substantially, they opt for nonrepresentation. It would thus
be beneficial for American labor leaders to become more politically
visible. They must also convince rank-and-file personnel that they
need a collective voice to counterbalance the economic power of
their corporate employers. The fact that executive compensation
has increased much faster than rank-and-file worker pay over the
past fifteen years (p. 61) should suggest that employees lack the
power to advance their own interests on an individualized basis.
Gould briefly mentions the fact that American labor officials
have not provided exemplary leadership (p. 31 ). He notes that undemocratic and corrupt leaders have contributed to the negative
public perception of unions. He also could have cited the fact that
union officers no longer reflect the heterogeneous composition of
the present labor market. Most national union officers continue to
be older, white males who evince the craft or industrial union philosophies of the 1950s or 1960s. They find it difficult to relate to the
women and minorities who have been entering the labor force in
record numbers. Many union officers also fail to comprehend the
need for both novel organizing techniques that will appeal to whiteers during organizing campaigns, see generally MARTIN JAY LEvrrr & TERRY CoNRow,
(1993).

CONFESSIONS OF A UNION BUSTER
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collar workers and new organizations that might reflect the aspirations of those employees.
In recent years, while many business firms have retained sophisticated behaviorists to convince white-collar workers that it would
be demeaning and unprofessional to collectivize, most labor organizers have continued to use blue-collar appeals that repulse
most educated employees. The American labor movement must
create new organizations that will do for white-collar industries,
such as banking, insurance, computers, and health care, what the
old industrial unions did for mass production industries during the
1930s and 1940s. Labor organizations will only survive in the coming decades if they can organize physicians, nurses, lawyers, computer specialists, insurance agents, :financial institution personnel,
and similar workers. As white-collar jobs become increasingly routinized, this task should become easier. Nonetheless, if labor leaders do not develop the necessary institutions now, unions may never
be able to regain their previous vitality.
II.

JOB SECURITY AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION PROTECTION

In Chapter Three, Gould discusses one of the most significant
differences between organized and unorganized workers - the
availability of protection against unjust dismissal. He emphasizes
the fact that individuals covered by collective bargaining agreements receive protection against unjust discipline through "just
cause" provisions and the availability of grievance arbitration procedures to review adverse employer decisions (pp. 63-64). Gould
then reviews the traditional employment-at-will doctrine that allows employers to terminate most employment relationships at any
time for any reason {pp. 66-67). He examines the three exceptions
to that doctrine that many state courts have created to deal with
perceived inequities. Most states have adopted a public policy exception that precludes discharges that contravene important public
policies {pp. 67-69). A number of jurisdictions have also adopted
an express or implied contract theory that enables wrongfully terminated workers to sue to enforce oral management representations or written personnel policy statements indicating that
employees will only be discharged for valid reasons (pp. 69-74). A
few state courts have provided employees with additional protection against unfair dismissals through their application of implied
covenants of good faith and fair dealing in individual employment
contracts (p. 72).
Gould notes that the United States is the only major industrial
nation that does not provide private sector workers with statutory
protection against unjust dismissals (p. 77). Even though he believes that employees receive the most effective job security
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through bargaining-agreement just cause and grievance-arbitration
provisions, Gould recognizes that the vast majority of American
workers who are unorganized enjoy no such protection (p. 77). The
author thus proposes the enactment of federal ·legislation that
would prohibit wrongful terminations (pp. 80-87). He discounts labor fears that the enactment of such statutory protection would diminish worker receptivity to unionization because he thinks that
unions would still provide the most expansive employment security
through just cause provisions (pp. 90-91). Under contractual just
cause provisions, labor arbitrators have traditionally required employers to demonstrate the presence of just cause for termination.25
Under a statutorily created wrongful termination law, however, discharged workers would presumably be obliged to establish that
they were impermissibly dismissed. This important proof distinction would thus provide unionized personnel with greater protection than would be available to their unorganized cohorts.
After a brief probationary period of up to one year, the statute
would cover all nonexecutive personnel employed by firms with at
least fifty workers.26 Courts could then use the traditional just
cause standards developed by labor arbitrators to determine which
terminations are inappropriate. Although unionized grievants
could have their cases resolved through grievance-arbitration procedures, unorganized complainants would have their cases resolved
by unemployment compensation administrative law judges who
regularly determine similar issues under misconduct disqualification
provisions (pp. 98-99). Wrongfully terminated individuals would be
presumptively entitled to monetary relief, but Gould would be reluctant to create a presumption in favor of reinstatement in the absence of union representatives who could monitor reinstatement
directives (p. 101).
Gould's recommendations are similar to those made by Professor Clyde Summers almost twenty years ago.27 They are as valid
today as they were then. Despite Montana's enactment of a wrongful termination law28 and the adoption of a Model Employment
Termination Act by the Uniform Commissioners on State Laws,29
little progress has been made in this critical area. If courts continue
to expand judicial exceptions in egregious discharge cases, employ25. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER Eucouro, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 661-63
(4th ed. 1985).
26. Pp. 87-88, 95-97. I would encourage Congress to extend wrongful discharge protection to finns with twenty-five or more employees, and possibly even to companies with fifteen or more employees that are now covered by typical federal civil rights statutes.
27. See Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust ,Dismissal: Tune for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
28. See MoNT. ConE ANN. § 39-2-901 to -915 (1993).
29. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) Individual Employment Rts. Manual 540:21 (Dec. 1991).
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ers will recognize that the cost of defending these claims and of
satisfying increasingly generous plaintiff verdicts is becoming extremely burdensome. They may thus realize that legislated protection with prescribed monetary remedies would be preferable to the
continued risk of excessive compensatory and punitive damage
awards in tort actions.
'
Employers should also acknowledge other benefits resulting
from wrongful termination protection.3o Managers frequently decry the lack of firm loyalty exhibited by contemporary employees.
But it is difficult to expect significant loyalty from newly hired individuals who are expressly informed that their new relationships
may be terminated at any time for any reason. H workers experienced greater corporate loyalty in the form of meaningful employment security, they would have a greater commitment to their
employers. Worker turnover would be reduced, and employee morale and productivity would probably increase. Companies would
also be more willing to assume the costs of employee training if
they thought that the trainees would be more likely to remain in
their employ in future years.
Proponents of wrongful termination statutes have often been as
reluctant as Gould to provide for the reinstatement of improperly
fired individuals who wish to return to their former employment
environments, but this reluctance is unfounded. When labor arbitrators conclude that unionized employees have been discharged in
contravention of contractual just cause provisions, they regularly
order reinstatement. Federal and state courts also use the reinstatement remedy to rectify discriminatory discharges based on race,
religion, gender, national origin, age, disability, or other impermissible factors. In my experience as a labor arbitrator, I have directed
the reinstatement of a number of grievants who had been unjustly
dismissed. I am not aware of a single case in which employers were
unable to return the grievants to their former positions.31 H expedited adjudication procedures could be provided through either
contractual grievance-arbitration mechanisms or administrative law
judge hearings, reinstatement difficulties should be rare. On the
other hand, if wrongfully terminated employees are not returned to
their former employment environments, they may suffer both emotional and monetary losses that cannot be alleviated satisfactorily
throµgh front pay or severance pay awards. Their future employ30. For cogent arguments in favor of wrongful termination legislation, see WEILER, supra
note l, at 48-104. For an economic argument supporting unrestrained freedom of contract,
see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 947 (1984).
31. Federal and state courts rarely encounter difficulties with respect to individuals they
reinstate to nonunion settings. If persons reinstated to nonunion environments under wrongful termination laws faced retaliation, they could always file additional wrongful termination
claims.
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ment security would also be diminished through the loss of their
previously accumulated seniority rights. I would thus urge adoption
of statutory provisions that would provide for the reinstatement of
unjustly discharged individuals.

III. THE NEED To CREATE WORKER
p ARTIC:q>ATION ~ROGRAMS
A. Gould's Analysis
Gould next turns, in Chapter Four, to worker participation programs in both the United States and other countries. He initially
notes that union leaders have not generally been receptive to such
programs because of the frequent use of shop committees and company unions during the 1930s and 1940s to prevent the selection of
independent bargaining representatives (p. 110). A number of
business firms have recently decided to create various quality of
work life (QWL) programs that involve shop-level committees consisting of employees and often managerial personnel. These committees are designed to enhance worker-management
communication and to improve productivity and quality (p. 111).
Gould carefully examines the German co-determination model
(pp. 115-17). The German Works Council Act requires firms to
create works councils at the shop level to enable employees to participate in decisions that affect their employment conditions and job
security. Corporate leaders must inform works councils about contemplated decisions that would affect employees and must supply
committee members with the information they need to evaluate the
possible effects of those decisions. Management officials must then
consult with works council members in an effort to achieve mutual
accommodations. If no agreements can be reached, arbitral or labor court proceedings resolve the issues (p. 116).
·
The works councils, which operate at the shop level, do not interfere with the functions of representative labor organizations that
negotiate agreements at the regional or national level (p. 116). The
Co-determination Act of 1976 provides employees with additional
input at the corporate level. Large firms are required to have corporate boards that are composed of one-third or one-half
employee-elected representatives (p. 117). Although procedural
rules permit shareholder and management representatives to make
final decisions regarding deadlocked issues, board members usually
endeavor to achieve mutually acceptable results.
Gould also evaluates innovative examples of labor-management
cooperation within the United States. He describes the collectively
bargained programs involving the United Automobile Workers
(UAW) and New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI),
and the UAW and Saturn, a General Motors subsidiary (pp. 123-
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31). Employees participate in production planning and learn different jobs that they perform on a rotating basis. General categories
replace narrowly defined job classifications, thus providing the
companies with managerial flexibility. NUMMI and Saturn executives recognized that cooperative programs designed to increase
worker productivity and product quality could succeed only if the
company promised employees reasonable job security and a share
of the resulting profits (pp. 126-27). Gould emphasizes that these
efforts involve "perpetual bargaining" over numerous issues of joint
interest that arise regularly in the shop (pp. 130-31).
Worker participation programs function most effectively, according to Gould, when compensation is related to skill levels and
to individual or group performance or both (p. 132). The author
indicates that employees know when they are being fleeced and
says that only meaningful worker participation plans can succeed in
the long run (p. 135). If corporate managers are the primary beneficiaries of enhanced firm revenues, lower-level workers will
quickly revert to pre-worker participation practices.
Older court and recent Labor Board decisions have made it difficult for firms to establish even bona fide worker participation programs without risking unfair labor practice liability under Section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA,32 which makes it unlawful for employers to
dominate or provide financial support to labor organizations. Because the NLRA expansively defines the term labor organization to
include any "employee representation committee or plan ... which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or conditions of work,"33 court and Labor Board
determinations have found certain worker participation committees
to constitute employer-dominated labor organizations.34
Gould suggests that Section 8(a)(2) has outlived its usefulness
and should simply be repealed (pp. 140-41). Although the abrogation of Section 8(a)(2) might appear to give disingenuous employers the opportunity to create sham worker-management
committees as an anti-union device, this fear is unfounded. Any
firm that engaged in such insincere behavior would clearly be guilty
of restraining or coercing its employees with respect to the exercise
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
33. 29 u.s.c. § 152(5) (1988).
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 311 N.LR.B. 893 (1993); Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35
F.3d 1148 (1994).
Some court decisions have been more flexible regarding the legality of bona fide worker
participation plans. See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert
denied, 423 U.S. fr75 (1975); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir.
1955).
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of their protected NLRA rights in violation of Section 8(a)(l).35
Although subtle uses of employee-employer committees to discourage collectivization might be difficult to prove, this is the type of
conduct the Labor Board has historically regulated with minimal
difficulty.
Despite his support for voluntary worker participation programs, Gould does not propose legislation mandating greater employee involvement in corporate management. Even though I
believe that many employees in white-collar and service occupations will eventually decide that collectivization may enhance their
employment interests, the union density rate in the private sector
will not likely ever exceed twenty to twenty-five percent in the
United States. American workers are so individualistic and afraid
of being considered part of the working class and employer opposition is so substantial that union membership figures could not conceivably approach those in many Western European countries.
Thus, seventy-five to eighty percent of private sector personnel will
continue to lack the ability to influence their employment destinies
through the traditional bargaining process. Gould deals with this
reality by suggesting that unions representing twenty or thirty percent of employees in a particular unit be given the legal right to
speak for those individuals (p. 141). Without more formal participation rights, however, it is doubtful that nonmajority representatives would possess the economic leverage they would need to
protect the persons they represent.
It is time for Congress to recognize two critical realities. First,
the NLRA has truly become an irrelevant statute for the vast majority of private sector employees. If unorganized workers are to
have the capacity to affect their employment conditions, the legislature must provide them with new statutory rights guaranteeing that
privilege. Second, corporate success is dependent upon three
symbiotic ~oups: (i) the investors who provide the necessary capital, (ii) the managers who provide the requisite leadership, and (iii)
the employees who carry out the regular job functions.
Corporate laws carefully protect the rights of business investors.
Prospective shareholders receive extensive firm information before
they decide to purchase shares, and they participate in the election
of corporate directors. Firm managers owe shareholders a fiduciary·
duty and are liable to stockholders who are injured by breaches of
this duty. Because capital is a highly mobile commodity, shareholders can protect their interests through diversification and through
transfer of their financial support from poorly performing businesses to other investments.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1988).
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Corporate managers also possess the capacity to protect themselves against adverse corporate decisions. They usually exercise
meaningful discretion with respect to decisions affecting their own
futures. Corporate managers can often avoid employment-at-will
insecurity through individual employment contracts that guarantee
their continued employment for specified time periods. They may
be able to obtain generous severance packages in case they lose
their positions through corporate reorganizations or buy-outs.
Moreover, they directly benefit from business success through bonus payments and stock options that are unavailable to most
subordinate personnel. Finally, corporate managers even have access to confidential business information that would let them know
when they should begin to contemplate alternative employment.
Rank-and-file employees are treated the same as the equipment
they use or operate. Even though they commit their working lives
to the success of their respective employers, their employment can
normally be terminated at any time for any reason. They are not
privy to confidential firm information, and they are not consulted
about contemplated business decisions that may affect their employment destinies. Although workers may resort to the "exit
voice" and seek other jobs when they are dissatisfied with firm developments, most lack the unique skills to enjoy significant mobility. Furthermore, their pension rights and length of service
frequently induce them to remain with their current employers during periods of declining firm performance.
B. Legislative-Approach

The time has come to provide rank-and-file personnel with fundamental employment dignity. Congress should enact an
employer-employee relations statute similar to the German Works
Constitution Act of 1972.36 The statute would require every employer with at least fifteen or twenty-five employees to create a
specified minimum number of works councils. One works council
would be required for each separate facility with no more than a
certain number of employees - for example, two hundred and fifty
employees. For large facilities, the law would require separate
works councils for each distinct department and for each group of
interrelated departments containing employees who share a com36. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Works Constitution Act], BGBl.I 13 (1972) (amended
1985) (F.R.G.) {discussed on p. 117). Professor Paul Weiler previously proposed the creation
of similar employee participation committees for American workers. See WEILER, supra
note 1, at 283-306; see also Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging
System of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 149 {1993). For an explication of the
German model, see Rudolf Buschmann, Workers Participation and Collective Bargaining in
Germany, 15 CoMP. LAB. W. 26 (1993).
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munity of employment interest.37 Every two years, employees
would nominate and elect the members of their respective works
councils. To ensure a meaningful dialogue between employees and
management and to provide some employment protections for
managerial personnel whose employment interests are more
aligned with their subordinates than their superiors, lower and middle managers would be allowed to elect one-fifth or one-quarter of
the council members.
·
·
Business firms would need to provide works council members
with information regarding basic operations and contemplated
changes that would meaningfully affect working conditions or employee job security.38 Proposed corporate changes concerning basic
operations, new technology, health and safety concerns, significant
job transfers to other facilities, group layoffs, and individual terminations would have to be presented to the appropriate works council for consideration.39 In most cases, works council members and
firm managers would likely agree upon the proper course to be
taken. Rank-and-file employees understand the need for firm efficiency and increased productivity to remain competitive in a global
economy, and they recognize that superfluous or incompetent personnel cannot be retained indefinitely without threatening the employment security of all workers.40 Managers would obtain a better
understanding of worker concerns and would be forced to recognize the need to formulate corporate decisions that would maximize
worker morale and loyalty. Congress should provide that when a
majority - or perhaps a weighted majority41 - of y.rorks council
members reject proposed managerial action, a mediator with business expertise who was previously selected by managers and works
council members would endeavor to achieve a conciliated agreement. In those .infrequent instances in which no mutual accord
could be reached, arbitrators selected by management and council
members would ultimately resolve the issue. Expedited procedures
37. Criteria similar to those presently used to define appropriate bargaining units under
the NLRA could be used to detennine appropriate works council groupings under my
proposal.
38. Without the elimination of the information imbalance that currently exists between
managers and lower-level personnel, employees would be unable to influence the corporate
decisionmaking process significantly. See Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over:
Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 76-78 (1993).
39. When fundamental issues would affect personnel covered by several works councils,
management would be required to consult with the relevant councils jointly in an effort to
achieve a mutually acceptable accommodation of the competing interests.
40. See JAMES c. FURLONG, LABOR IN THE BOARDROOM 45, 131 (1977).
41. To minimize works council-manager confrontations and the difficulties those controversies could generate, weighted majorities of 60% or two-thirds might be required to reject
managerial decisions. Congress might alternatively allow councils bare majority rejections
for less significant issues and require weighted-majority rejections for fundamental policy
determinations.
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could be used to generate final decisions within several days with
respect to matters that must be resolved quickly.
Congress should also mandate the election of one-quarter or
one-third of corporate board members by nonexecutive personnel.
Both rank-and-file employees and lower-level managers should be
given the opportunity to vote. This would guarantee board consideration of worker interests when. important firm policies are debated. All corporate board members should be both obliged to
consider worker interests when making business decisions and subject to liability to rank-and-file employees when they violate this
:fiduciary obligation.42 Statutory provisions should recognize their
dual loyalties to shareholders and to workers by granting the board
members sufficient discretion to make good faith managerial decisions when stockholder and employee interests conflict without the
fear of liability. On the other hand, when board members fail to
consider worker interests adequately, they should be subject to the
same legal accountability that would result if they failed to respect
the interests of shareholders.
The adoption of mandated worker participation programs
would not render labor organizations obsolete. They could continue to provide employees with the expertise and assistance they
would need when dealing with corporate boards or works councils.43 Unions should have the right to nominate employee slates
for works council positions and should serve as a deterrent preventing employer agents from coercing or restraining employees with
respect to the nomination and election of council or corporate
board members. Such activities would significantly diminish firm
conduct designed to undermine free worker elections.
If a majority of employee-elected council members were affiliated with a particular labor organization, that entity would be
granted exclusive bargaining rights similar to those currently enjoyed by majority bargaining agents under the NLRA. If no labor
organization enjoyed majority support, each union with twenty or
twenty-five percent employee-elected council member support
would be entitled to formal consultation rights.44 Firm managers
would be required to consult with representatives from each organization with the requisite support before they made final decisions
concerning matters affecting employee interests. Even though for"
42. See Gottesman, supra note 38, at 93-95; see also Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring
the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty To Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189 (1991).
43. See generally Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25
U.S.F. L. REv. 169 (1991).
44. In chapter 5, Professor Gould supports the concept of minority union representation
rights similar to those proposed here; see also Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken:
Some Thoughts on Nonmajority Employee Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (1993).
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mal bargaining would not be necessary, these minority entities
could provide managers with critical input, such as proposing alternatives that would be less injurious to employee interests.
Business leaders would undoubtedly denounce legislative proposals calling for the establishment of works councils and workerelected board members as unworkable and inefficient. What they
would most re8ent would be the need to share their corporate
power with rank-and-file personnel. Employees are not ignorant
people. They usually understand basic operations, sometimes even
more thoroughly than upper managers. Workers are in an advantageous position to enhance productivity and firm quality, but they
are presently hesitant to do so because such improvements might
undermine their job security. If employers treated them as corporate partners in a cooperative venture and employees realized that
new developments would not unduly affect their employment
rights, the employees would be more inclined to propose and support operational changes.
IV.

PROPOSED REFORM OF THE

NLRA

In Chapter Five, Gould suggests that after sixty years; it is time
to reassess the efficacy of the NLRA. He notes the call of some
unionists for repeal of this legislation based on its unfair constraints
on the exercise of collective power through secondary activity (pp.
153-54). The author rejects this position, believing that a modified
NLRA can continue to protect employee rights. Although my proposed statutory changes mandating the creation of works councils
and the election of employee representatives to corporate boards
would render NLRA amendments superfluous, I realize that a
probusiness Congress would be unlikely to contemplate seriously
such radical changes in American employment law. People who
think that President Clinton might consider my proposals should
remember that his major legislative accomplishments at the time of
this review have been the Senate approval of the Republicannegotiated and business-community-supported North American
Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and the enactment of a relatively conservative crime bill; The election of Republican majorities in the House and Senate further diminishes the likelihood of
proworker legislative reform.
A. Representation Election and Certification Reform
Gould maintains that the Labor Board excessively regulates the
representation election process, especially with respect to campaign
propaganda (p. 152). The empirical study of representation elections conducted by Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman dur-
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ing the early 1970s provides support for this notion.45 Although
subsequent evaluations of the same database have suggested that
these experts may have underestimated the impact of coercive employer statements on employee voting,46 Gould believes that employees are capable of recognizing electioneering for what it is.
Because I agree with the Supreme Court's admonition that "any
balancing of [employer and employee] rights must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that
relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that
might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear,"47 I
have argued in favor of greater Labor Board regulation of this
area.48 If truly free elections are to occur, neither party should be
permitted to mislead intentionally or to threaten implicitly prospective voters in a manner that would be likely to affect their vote.
Gould notes that nonemployee union organizer access to employer premises is severely limited (pp. 157-58). Such organizers
are not permitted to distribute union literature even on retail store
parking lots that are open to prospective customers.49 Employees
may proselytize in favor of collectivization only during nonworktime, even though employer agents may disseminate their antiunion message during worktime.50 Employers can inundate workers with anti-union propaganda through captive audience speeches,
supervisory discussions, bulletin board notices, and personal memoranda or letters. Business firms thus enjoy an enormous advantage
during organizing campaigns. Gould would alleviate this substantial imbalance through rules providing union organizers with access
to company property open to the public and access to other appropriate areas after representation petitions have been filed (p. 158).
This change in existing NLRA law would greatly enhance the opportunity of union organizers to communicate with targeted
employees.
Gould acknowledges that extended representation proceedings
tend to provide employers with the extra time they need to defeat
union organizing drives. He notes that some Canadian provinces
45. See Juuus G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELEcnONS: LAW AND
REALITY (1976).
46. See, e.g., William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification
Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 560, 567-75 (1983).
47. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
48. See Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve
Industrial Democracy, 34 Aruz. L. REv. 397, 411, 419 (1992).
49. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992); see also NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (banning union organizers from distributing literature on
company-owned parking lots).
50. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
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conduct elections within five days after union petitions have been
filed, and he proposes similarly expedited procedures for NLRA
elections (p. 158). The author also documents the two- or threeyear delay between the unlawful termination of union supporters
and their judicially enforced reinstatement orders (pp. 158-59). He
suggests that the Labor Board make greater use of Section 10G)s1
temporary restraining orders that would allow the immediate reinstatement of union sympathizers illegally discharged during organizing campaigns (pp. 160-61). This procedure would greatly
diminish the chilling effect of discriminatory terminations during
union organizing drives.
Gould indicates that prolonged delays could be avoided if Congress amended the NLRA to authorize Labor Board certifications
based upon authorization card demonstrations of adequate support
(pp. 162-63). Several Canadian provinces allow card-based certification when unions establish fifty-five or sixty percent support, and
this approach would greatly enhance union organizing. Gould appropriately recognizes that peer pressure may induce some workers
to sign authorization cards they might not have otherwise signed,
and therefore he proposes that card-based certification require a
supermajority of fifty-five or sixty percent (p. 163). Such a requirement would not affect most labor organizations, because few petition for Labor Board elections until they have obtained cards
signed by sixty or seventy percent of the employees in proposed
units.
B. Obligation To Bargain and Scope of Bargaining Reforms
Even when unions obtain Labor Board certification, their struggle for representation rights is not over. Employers frequently decline to recognize newly certified organizations, forcing them to
prosecute refusal-to-bargain charges. It may take a year or more
for the Labor Board to issue remedial bargaining orders in these
cases, and losing employers can avoid bargaining for an additional
year while the Labor Board petitions for court of appeals enforcement orders. To curtail these delays, Gould proposes that Labor
Board certifications include bargaining directives that may be directly appealed to courts of appeal without the need for unfair labor practice proceedings before administrative law judges (p. 164).
This practice would greatly diminish the delay between certifications and court-enforced bargaining orders. In cases in which employer objections to union certification are clearly without merit,
the Labor Board should be required to seek temporary bargaining
orders under Section lO(j) to allow prevailing unions to demand
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1600) {1988) authorizes district courts to grant temporary injunctive relief
while unfair labor practice cases are being litigated.
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bargaining while certification cases are being appealed to appellate
courts.
In almost forty percent of cases in which unions obtain certification, they are unable to negotiate initial bargaining agreements.s2
Many of these negotiation failures are due to employer recalcitrance, as employers are disappointed with their election loss and
hope to defeat the prevailing unions at the bargaining table through
disingenuous bargaining. Gould supports the laws of certain Canadian provinces53 that require parties that are unable to achieve first
contracts to resolve their disputes through binding interest arbitration (pp. 168-70). Because I believe that the Labor Board should
be given the authority to provide make-whole relief to workers victimized by manifestly unjustified employer refusals-to-bargain
through compensation awards approximating what the employees
would presumably have obtained had the firms negotiated in good
faith, 54 I would have no difficulty accepting the concept of first contract interest arbitration.
The negotiating parties would initially attempt to achieve a vol-.
untary resolution of their competing differences. If that objective
could not be attained because of uncompromising employer behavior, arbitral determination would resolve the conflict. Arbitrators
should be required to follow legislatively prescribed standards, and
they must decide which party made the more reasonable final offer
on an issue-by-issue or total-package basis. These constraints
would prevent unprincipled arbitral awards. The availability of
final-offer arbitration would also encourage parties to resolve their
initial differences through the bargaining process, in recognition of
the fact that negotiation impasses would no longer lead to the premature emasculation of newly certified labor organizations.
Finally, Gould decries the limited scope of bargaining currently
available to representative labor organizations (pp. 170-73). In
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 55 the Supreme Court
completely ignored the proper function of unions as it severely restricted the scope of bargaining required over management decisions affecting employee job security:
Management must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business. It
also must have some degree of certainty beforehand as to when it may
proceed to reach decisions without fear of later evaluations labeling
S2. See SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON Eouc. &
LABOR, 98TH CoNo., 2o SESS., THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAW- A BE1RAYAL OF AMERICAN
WORKERS, 10 (Comm. Print 1984), excerpted in LEROY
MERRIFIELD ET AL, LABOR RELA·
TIONS LAW S9, 62 (9th ed. 1994).

s.

S3. See WEILER, supra note 1, at 249-Sl.
54. See Craver, supra note 48, at 433-34.
SS. 4S2 U.S. 666 (1981).
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its conduct an unfair labor practice.... [I)n view of an employer's
need for unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labormanagement relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.56

The First National Maintenance majority was unduly concerned
about labor interference with managerial freedom. It failed to acknowledge that when Congress enacted the NLRA, it made the legislative determination that worker "interference" with managerial
discretion was an appropriate consequence of an industrial relations
system that provides employees with meaningful input regarding
their basic employment conditions. Despite the curtailment of
managerial freedom involved, I agree with Gould's proposal to expand the scope of bargaining to include most issues of real concern
to employees (pp. 170-73). I also concur in his proposal to require
business firms to provide representative unions with greater corporate information to enable them to perform their representational
function more effectively (p. 175).
Although I support the NLRA proposals that Gould makes and
believe that they would be of limited benefit to organizing unions
and represented employees, I also think that these modifications
would be analogous to the rearranging of deck chairs on the
Titanic. The American labor movement is in dire trouble, and minor NLRA changes will not make a significant difference. If the
vast majority of U.S. workers who are unlikely to select union representation is to receive meaningful employment rights, legislatures
must enact laws similar to those proposed earlier with respect to the
creation of works councils and the election of employee representatives on corporate boards.57 Only these legislative programs could
provide workers with the scope of industrial democracy that one
should expect in a truly free society.
V.

THE ENHANCEMENT OF WORKER ECONOMIC POWER

Gould acknowledges that industrial and economic developments have significantly diminished the efficacy of the traditional
strike weapon (pp. 181-83). Increasingly diverse and technologically advanced business enterprises are finding it easier to withstand the impact of work stoppages. Managerial personnel can
often maintain production by keeping automated equipment func56. 452 U.S. at 678-79.
57. Regarding the need for more expansive and more innovative labor law reform, see
Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 Cm.KE.NT L. RE.v. 3, 20-46 (1993).
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tioning. Lost production may be transferred to facilities in other
states or other countries.
Another important factor contributing to the decline of the
work stoppage concerns the lack of legal protection given to striking personnel. As early as 1938, the Supreme Court held that employers could hire permanent replacements for striking employees,
despite the negative impact of the replacement option on the exercise of the statutorily protected right to strike.58 The Court apparently believed employers' need to continue operations during a
strike outweighed employees' right to engage in work stoppages.
Nonetheless, for over four decades, few American firms exercised
their "right" to hire permanent replacements during work stoppages. Employers have used the Mackay Radio doctrine more frequently in recent years, however, following President Reagan's
1981 decision to terminate 11,000 unlawfully striking air traffic controllers. A recent AFL-CIO study found that employers permanently replaced eleven percent of the 243,300 individuals who
participated in major work stoppages during 1990.59 It is doubtful
that the thousands of displaced strikers received solace from the
fact they had been "permanently replaced" due to employer desires
to continue operations rather than "discharged" because of antistrike motivations. Most were forced to seek other gainful employment, and their representative labor organizations probably ceased
to function as viable bargaining agents for the new workers.
The year before Mackay Radio, when the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the NLRA, it eloquently acknowledged that individuals lacked the capacity to counterbalance the
economic power possessed by their corporate employers:
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that
they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was
dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself
and family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he
thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to give
laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.60

If meaningful collective bargaining is to exist without the need for

excessive government intervention, the strike weapon must be preserved and even strengthened.
Gould recommends a statutory modification of the Mackay Radio rule that would prohibit the hiring of permanent replacements
58. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-47 (1938).
59. AFL-CIO Study Indicates Increase in Permanent Replacement of Strikers, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 114, at A-3 (June 13, 1991).
60. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).

May 1995]

Labor Law Reform

1639

until a work stoppage has continued for at least six months (pp.
201-02). I previously suggested a balancing approach that would
allow struck employers to continue operations initially through the
retention of temporary replacements.61 They could only hire permanent replacements if they could demonstrate - after a one-,
two-, or three-month period - that local labor market conditions
precluded the employment of qualified temporary personnel.
Congress enacted the original NLRA to provide individual
workers with collective empowerment. Pursuant to that statute,
employees involved in a labor dispute could exert direct pressure
against the target firm, and they could enlist the support of secondary parties. By inducing the employees of secondary companies to
cease handling products going to or coming from the struck business, the primary workers were able to increase their bargaining
leverage. In 1947, business leaders induced Congress to proscribe
many forms of secondary behavior, and in 1959, the legislature prohibited most of the remaining forms of secondary action.
If Congress wants to maintain a laissez faire posture, it should
amend the NLRA to permit some forms of secondary activity.62
When a work stoppage is effective, it shuts down the operations of
the target firm. As a result, that firm suspends its purchases of raw
materials and reduces its shipment of finished goods. When striking employees are unable to generate a complete cessation of primary firm operations, they could be allowed to expand their
concerted appeal to employees of those secondary businesses that
deal directly with the struck employer as suppliers or customers.
They could induce the workers of those secondary firms to refuse to
handle the raw materials destined for the struck plant or the finished goods coming from that establishment during the primary
work stoppage.
Business leaders would undoubtedly resist any efforts to reverse
Mackay Radio or to expand the secondary appeals for support that
could be made by striking employees. They realize that they are in
a superior economic position, and they do not wish to let legislative
modifications redress the substantial power imbalance that cur- ·
rently exists. Nonetheless, if Congress believes that viable labor organizations are indispensable attributes of industrial democracy, it
must increase the economic leverage available to those entities. If
members of Congress are concerned about the production losses
that expanded work stoppages would generate, they could consider
alternatives that would not cause operational disruptions. They
could require resort to tripartite interest arbitration to resolve bargaining disputes, with the arbitration panel selecting the more rea61. See Craver, supra note 48, at 422-23.
62. See id. at 424-25.
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sonable final offer made by the employer or the representative
union - on an issue-by-issue or total-package approach.
Alternatively, Congress could amend the NLRA to authorize
only "statutory strikes" that would not entail actual work disruptions.63 Once a bargaining impasse was reached, the employer or
the union could declare a "strike." Production and services would
continue as usual, but employee compensation would be reduced by
a specified amount - for example, ten or fifteen percent - and
firm revenues would be reduced by a similar percentage. If the parties resolved their dispute expeditiously, the withheld compensation
and revenues could be returned to the workers and the company. If
the controversy was not settled quickly, however, the withheld
funds could be permanently transferred to the public treasury.
Although statutory strikes would not involve work disruptions, the
statutorily prescribed financial incentives would encourage labor
and management negotiators to resolve their controversies in an expeditious manner.
As Gould recognizes, meaningful collective bargaining is impossible if one party to the interaction lacks real leverage. Over the
past several decades, the bargaining power of labor has waned
while that of employers has increased. Many unions are so weak
that they are effectively reduced to collective begging. They are
forced to take whatever the employers are willing to give them.
Congress must decide whether the United States should become
the only country in the advanced world to have no viable labor
movement. If it does not move quickly, the issue will unfortunately
become entirely academic.
VI.

CONTRASTING THE AMERICAN AND
CANADIAN EXPERIENCES

When observers attempt to understand the reasons for the substantial decline of U.S. labor organizations over the past several
decades, they frequently make comparisons to the Canadian union
experience. That nation's provincial labor relations statutes are
similar to the NLRA, and many of their industries and trade unions
have close ties to U.S. entities. In Chapter Seven, Gould explores
the Canadian situation and attempts to explain why Canadian trade
unions have not experienced the same membership losses as their
U.S. counterparts. He notes that Canadians tend to be less individualistic than U.S. residents and that Canadians exhibit greater social and class cohesiveness.64
63. See generally George W. Goble, The Non-Stoppage Strike, 2 LAB. L.J. 105 (1951);
David B. McCalmont, The Semi-Strike, 15 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 191 (1962).
64. P. 208; see Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993
B.Y.U. L REv. 727.
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In addition, most Canadian employers respect the right of their
employees to organize and do not resort to the overtly coercive tactics used by many U.S. firms to defeat organizing campaigns. Several of the Canadian labor statutes facilitate union organizing by
permitting authorization-card based certification when unions obtain fifty-five or sixty percent support (p. 215). Even when elections are required, they are conducted in an expedited manner often within five days after representation petitions are filed (pp.
215-16). These two practices preclude unnecessary delays and limit
the opportunity for resort to the anti-union conduct so prevalent
during drawn-out organizing campaigns in the United States.
U.S. employers frequently characterize proposals to allow cardbased certification under the NLRA as "radical." They overlook
the fact that the original Wagner Act authorized card-based certification as it provided that the Labor Board "may take a secret ballot
of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascert[a]in
such representatives."65 In a perfect world, I would prefer secret
ballot elections to card checks because of the possibility that employees may have signed authorization cards due to social pressure,
misunderstanding, or outright coercion. Congress must acknowledge, however, that neutral elections do not usually occur. Employers frequently imply that pro-union votes will result in lost
employment, and a number of firms graphically demonstrate this
possibility through the unlawful termination of key union supporters during the organizing campaigns.
If we could guarantee elections within five or ten days after the
filing of representation petitions - and if coercive campaign techniques could be effectively proscribed - resort to secret ballot
elections would be the preferable option. If the Labor Board could
not conduct elections on an expedited basis, then I would fav.or
card-based certification in limited circumstances. I would prefer to
have Congress amend the NLRA to mandate elections within five
or ten days after petitions are filed, except when extraordinary circumstances would preclude an expedited election.
Gould recognizes that only about two-thirds of the unions that
receive Labor Board certification ever obtain first contracts (p.
222). This figure is substantially below the eighty-four percent success rate experienced by certified labor organizations in Ontario (p.
223, tbl. 7-3). 1\vo factors account for this difference: (i) U.S. employers know that if they can avoid the execution of bargaining
agreements during the certification year, they can often defeat the
newly certified unions;66 and (ii) the Ontario labor relations statute
65. Wagner Act, ch. 372, sec. 9(c), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935), set forth in N.LR.B., LEGISLAAcr, 1935, at 3274 (1959).
66. See LEVIIT & CoNRow, supra note 24, at 201-25.
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mandates first-contract interest arbitration when the negotiating
parties are unable to achieve their own agreements due to employer
recalcitrance (pp. 222-27).
VII.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

William Gould has written a thoughtful and provocative book
that is especially timely due to the election of President Clinton, the
creation of the Dunlop Commission to study the need for labor law
reform, and the appointment of Gould himself as Chair of the
NLRB. Americans must decide whether we believe that independent labor organizations are an important aspect of a democratic society. If we do not act quickly to reverse the long-standing union
decline, labor entities may become irrelevant by the end of this decade. The NLRA changes that Gould proposes would certainly
help. Election campaigns would become less coercive, and the certification process would be greatly expedited. Employee free
choice would be more effectively protected, and unions would
probably obtain more certifications than they do under existing
NLRA doctrines.
Gould implicitly acknowledges, however, that a labor movement revival would not likely extend collective protection to a majority of U.S. employees. Many would be hesitant to organize for
fear of being considered unprofessional or even lower class. Nevertheless, innovative new entities may be created that would be more
analogous to the American Bar Association or the American Medical Association than to present AFL-CIO affiliates, and such organizations would have a greater appeal to white-collar and
professional personnel. It is important to remember that the American Nurses Association, the National Education Association, the
American Association of University Professors, and similar entities
were, not so long ago, wholly professional groups with no labor
agendas. The British Medical Association, by contrast, has been a
registered trade union for several decades.
Despite the image of U.S. residents as rugged individualists,
most Americans are group-oriented when they endeavor to advance their economic interests. Business firms are associated with
various groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce, the National
Association of Manufacturers, and specific industry organizations.
Attorneys have the American Bar Association, physicians the
American Medical Association, older people the American Association of Retired Persons, women the National Organization for
Women, and African-Americans the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. Each distinct profession has at
least one professional group to advance member interests. It is indeed ironic that although collective power is appropriate for profes-

May 1995]

Labor Law Reform

1643

sionals and independent entrepreneurs, it is considered
inappropriate and unprofessional for rank-and-file workers. Those
persons who most lack individual bargaining power and who most
need a collective voice to advance their interests are expected and
even encouraged to eschew organizational strength. Employers go
to great lengths to prevent their employees from enjoying the same
group benefits they derive from their own professional associations.
Congress should finally ensure that workers have the unfettered
right to organize that the Wagner Act originally granted to employees. The adoption of Gould's proposed NLRA amendments would
constitute a significant improvement over the status quo.
Labor law experts must now admit that the NLRA has become
an antiquated and relatively meaningless statute. It no longer protects worker organizational rights, nor does it provide unionized
employees with expansive bargaining opportunities or meaningful
economic leverage. If the vast majority of private sector personnel
are to enjoy employment rights beyond the minimal terms unilaterally offered by their employers, those privileges will have to be provided through federal legislation.
The most effective way to grant employees meaningful influence
over their terms of employment would be to mandate the creation
of shop-level works councils and the election of employee representatives to corporate boards. These worker participation programs would give individual employees the right to be consulted
regarding contemplated firm policies that would affect their employment interests. Local works _councils could also explore ways in
which to increase productivity and product or service quality in a
manner that would simultaneously advance the interests of both
workers and employers. I am disappointed that Gould does not
support legislatively-mandated worker participation programs.
I agree with Gould that specific statutory provisions should prohibit unjust dismissals and provide administrative or arbitral procedures to review challenged terminations. I also think that Congress
should acknowledge the unconscionably low wages and minimal
fringe benefits enjoyed by millions of American workers. Elected
representatives can no longer assume that these issues are resolved
through private collective bargaining, because so few individuals
have their employment terms determined through the collective
process. The minimum wage should be increased to an appropriate
level, with variable scales adopted to take into account the capacity
of different industries to afford specified labor costs.
Anyone concerned with the rights of American workers should
read Agenda for Reform. It contains many proposals that would
enhance the employment interests of most persons. Nonetheless,
readers should recognize that Gould's suggestions provide only a

1644

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:1616

modest beginning. If U.S. personnel are to enjoy the fundamental
rights already available to workers in most other advanced nations,
far more legislative protections are necessary. These changes may
initially seem radical, but they would merely prepare the United
States for the twenty-first century. The other industrial nations
have already demonstrated that firms can maintain humane employment conditions and still be competitive in a global economy.
It is time for the United States to exhibit a similar commitment to
its most precious resource - its human capital.67
67. See generally Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing
Corporate Law To Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 18 CORNELL L. REV. 899
(1993).

